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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee : Case No. 950383-CA 
vs. : 
SHANE DOYLE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
gyRIgpiCTION AflP NATWE OF PRPCggPHWS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of 
methamphetaTnine in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1) and (5) (Supp. 1994), 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this proceeding as provided by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the "all persons present" warrant, pursuant to which 
defendant was searched, supported by probable cause? The trial 
court's underlying factual determinations are subject to reversal 
only if clearly erroneous, while the trial court's determination 
of probable cause is reviewed for correctness, according the 
trial court a "measure of discretion." State v. Poole. 871 P.2d 
531, 533 (Utah 1994). The deference accorded the trial court's 
legal determination is a recognition of the multitude of fact 
patterns with which a trial court must grapple and which may-
constitute probable cause. Id. (reviewing the trial court's 
factual and legal determinations of probable cause under the same 
standards applied to determinations of reasonable suspicion, as 
articulated in State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935, 939-40, 939 n.4 
(Utah 1994)). 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the warrant 
as executed was constitutional? This issue is analyzed under the 
same standard noted in paragraph 1, above. 
CONSTITUTIONS PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP RPLES 
United States Constitution 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place 'to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possessing methamphetamine in a 
drug free zone, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1) and (5) (Supp. 1994) (Count I), possessing or 
using marijuana in a drug free zone, a Class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of section 58-37-8(2) (Count II) and unlawfully 
possessing drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a Class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of sections 58-37a-5 and 
58-37-8(5) (R. 6-7). Count II was dismissed at the end of the 
preliminary hearing, and defendant was bound over on Counts I and 
III, to which he pleaded not guilty (R. 8-10). Defendant moved 
to suppress evidence on the grounds that the search warrant was 
unconstitutional (motion and memorandum in support, R. 18, 30-38, 
attached at ), which the trial court denied (R. 44-45, 126-63).1 
Thereafter, defendant entered a no contest plea to the reduced 
charge of possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone 
(Count I), a second degree felony, specifically conditioned on 
the dismissal of Count III and the reservation of his right to 
appeal issues raised in his suppression motion (R. 55-58). 
1 Relevant addenda are appended in chronological/procedural 
order: affidavit in support of a search warrant (R. 26-29, 
Addendum A); search warrant (R. 24-25, Addendum B); transcript of 
preliminary hearing (R. 79-124, Addendum C); transcript of 
suppression hearing (R. 126-162, Addendum D); and findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and order (R. 67-69, Addendum E). 
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Defendant was then sentenced to thirty-six months probation (R. 
65-66) . 
STATEMENT PF THE TACTS 
On November 9, 1994, Provo City Police Officer Jerry Harper, 
an officer for fifteen years with extensive training and 
experience in narcotics investigation, drafted an affidavit in 
support of a search warrant (R. 29). The affidavit states that 
on September 21, 1994, Provo Police received an anonymous phone 
call indicating that the Steven and Angela Hundley, living at 255 
N. 1600 W. #121 in Provo, were using and selling cocaine (R. 28). 
The caller also indicated that Steven Hundley was dealing drugs 
heavily at Mountain States Steel, his place of employment (R. 
28). In October, 1994 a confidential informant, known to Officer 
Harper to have been previously reliable, corroborated the fact 
that Steven Hundley was selling cocaine (R. 28). 
On November 7, 1994, Provo City Police officers searched the 
Hundley's street-side trash can, finding methamphetamine 
paraphernalia with residue, marijuana leaves and stems, syringes, 
baggies and butane fuel canisters (R. 28). The amounts of 
methamphetamine residue and marijuana implied small amounts for 
use (R. 27). Officer Harper stated that such drug paraphernalia 
can be "quickly and easily hidden in the clothing or be destroyed 
if intent is given to search'' and that controlled substances and 
paraphernalia are often kept in outlying vehicles and buildings 
(R. 27). He also stated that in his experience persons involved 
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with the illegal use of marijuana and methamphetamine generally 
sell such substances and that he expected to find additional 
controlled substances as well as evidence related to production 
and distribution (R. 27). Finally, the affidavit identified the 
Hundley's residence as a single-wide mobile home (R. 27). 
On November 9, 1994, a warrant based on Officer Harper's 
affidavit was issued authorizing the search of the Hundley home 
and "any outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any 
individuals present at the time of the execution of this warrant" 
(R. 24) . 
The search warrant was executed on November 11, 1994 (R. 
82). When the officers entered the residence, only Steve and 
Angela Hundley and a child were inside (R. 88). Between forty 
and seventy-five minutes later, after the Hundley's had been 
arrested, defendant arrived in a car driven by Teri Olsen (R. 89, 
114-15). Ms. Olsen parked her car directly behind another 
vehicle which was parked in front of the Hundley's trailer (R. 
93-94, 111, 142)). Defendant came to the door and entered the 
trailer while the police officers were still inside the residence 
completing their search (R. 89-90, 98). 
A search of defendant revealed drug paraphernalia which 
tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 116). Defendant was 
placed under arrest, and the vehicle he arrived in was searched 
(R. 116). In defendant's jacket investigating officers found 
drug paraphernalia including a small butane canister, a pencil-
5 
like butane torch and an audio cassette case containing three 
baggies of methamphetamine (R. 85, 99, 103). After being advised 
of his Miranda rights defendant admitted the paraphernalia and 
drugs were his (R. 117-118). 
SUMMARY or ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant fails to develop with any argument or legal 
authority his claim that the warrant lacked particularity as to 
"outbuildings, curtilage or persons present," and therefore, the 
Court should refuse to consider it on appeal. 
The "all persons present" warrant was supported by an 
affidavit showing a nexus between criminal activity on the 
premises to be searched and any persons at the premises. The 
affadavit stated that occupants of certain premises were dealing 
cocaine, that police officers had found methamphetamine and 
marijuana residues and associated paraphernalia in the occupants' 
street-side trash can only two days before the affidavit was 
signed, that the premises were a single-wide trailer, that in the 
attesting officer's experience drug users would make sales of 
controlled substances which could easily be concealed or 
destroyed, and that evidence of controlled substances would 
likely be found on persons on the premises. Considering the 
limited size of 1:he premises, the difficulty in specifically 
identifying drug users because of the shifting nature of the 
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criminal activity and the ease with which drugs may be concealed 
or destroyed, the warrant was constitutionally sufficient. 
POINT II 
Contrary to defendant's claim, that even if an "all persons 
present" warrant is constitutionally valid there must be an 
individualized showing of probable cause as to any given person 
on specifice premises, Utah law makes clear that it is only 
necessary to show a nexus between premises harboring widespread 
criminal activity and any person appearing on the premises. 
Defendant cites no authority to support his claim that the 
warrant was improperly executed because he was searched 
following his arrival on the premises, about an hour after the 
police had begun executing the warrant but while they were still 
packaging evidence. 
The implicit basis of the trial court's ruling sanction the 
search of the car, i.e., search incident to arrest, is correct. 
Therefore, defendant has no valid claim under the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionsary rule to preclude the results of the 
search of the car. 
7 
ABffPMSNT 
POINT I 
*ALL PERSONS PRESENT" WARRANTS HAVE BEEN 
UPHELD IN UTAH UNDER BOTH THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Defendant first argues that the "all persons present" search 
warrant issued in this case lacked the particularity required by 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 77-23-201, 203 (1995),2 because it "[did not] to give a 
particularized description of the 'outbuildings, curtilage, 
vehicles or persons present' that are also subject to the 
2
 Defendant contends that this Court should give article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution a more expansive reading than 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Appellant's Br. at 10. However, because defendant wmerely relies 
upon general statements that Utah has a unique history and cites to 
cases from other contexts where the Utah Constitution has been 
interpreted differently from the United States Constitution, this 
Court should not engage in an independent state constitutional 
analysis under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah App. 1994). 
Furthermore, because defendant has only nominally referenced 
article I, section 14 in his memorandum in support of his motion to 
supress, and only in parallel with the Fourth Amendment (R. 31-36), 
and did not mention a state constitutional basis for his claims at 
the suppression hearing (R. 126-63), this Court should find that 
the issue has not been preserved or appeal. State v. Gibbons. 74 0 
P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (a reviewing court ordinarily "will not 
entertain an issue first raised on appeal in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances or plain error"); State v. Price. 837 
P.2d 578, 580-81 (Utah App. 1992). See alfifi State v. Sterger. 808 
P.2d 122, 124 (Utah App. 1991) (refusing to consider a state 
constitutional argument which had only been nominally alluded to in 
the trial court, citing State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d -1268, 1269 (Utah 
App. 1990). The same argument applies with greater force to 
defendant's reference to Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2-201, 203 (1995), 
which defendant never mentioned in the trial court. 
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search." Appellant's Br. at 10-11. Secondarily, defendant 
argues that the "all persons present" warrant was defective as 
such, citing in support precisely those cases relied on in State 
v. Covington. 274 Utah Adv. Rep 22, 23-24 (Utah App. 1995), 
wherein this Court found valid "all persons present" warrants in 
appropriate circumstances. Appellant's Br. at Point I, 11-15. 
However, all cases cited by defendant, including Covington, rely 
on the "nexus" test, which requires that an "all persons present" 
warrant is supported by probable cause if the supporting 
affidavit shows there is a sufficient connection between the 
criminal activity, the place of the activity and the persons at 
the place. £££ State v. Hinkel. 365 N.W.2d 774, 775-76 (Minn. 
1985); State v. De Simone. 288 A.2d 849, 850-51 (N.J. 1972); 
State v. Anderson. 415 N.W.2d 57, 58-60 (Minn. App. 1987); 
Commonwealth v. Smith. 348 N.E.2d 101, 105-06 (Mass. 1976), cert, 
denied. 492 U.S. 944 (1976). Because defendant fails to 
adequately argue his first point on appeal, and because this case 
falls within those circumstances described in Covington and its 
supporting authority, defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
conclusions are without merit. 
A. Standard of Review 
Defendant argues that this Court should correct the trial 
court's legal conclusion that Mt]he authority granting paragraph 
in the warrant in its totality is neither too broad or vague," 
Appellant's Br. at 15, thereby suggesting that the validity of 
9 
the warrant is subject to de novo review for correctness. 
Appellant's Br. at 2. However, defendant ultimately argues the 
insufficiency of the magistrate's probable cause determination 
based on the affidavit. Appellant's Br. at 14-15. It is the 
State's contention that the same standard of deferential review 
employed by the trial court in considering the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause should be applied by this Court 
to the trial court's implicit conclusion that the warrant was 
based on probable cause. See also Covington. 274 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 25 (analyzing precisely the same issue in terms of whether 
probable cause had been established by the affidavit). 
"A trial court does not conduct a de novo review in 
determining if there is probable cause to support the issuance of 
a search warrant, Illinois V, Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. 
Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 
991 (Utah 1989); State v. Miller. 740 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah App. 
1987), but rather must 'pay great deference to the magistrate's 
decision.' Babbell. 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting £&£££, 462 U.S. at 
238-39)." State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 284, (Utah App. 1990). The 
probable cause standard requires "'only the probability, and not 
a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.'" Id. (Citing Gates. 
462 U.S. at 235). "Accordingly, the magistrate must consider all 
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit and make a 
'practical, common-sense decision whether . . . there is a fair 
probability' that criminal evidence will be found in the 
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described place. Gates. 462 U.S. at 238; £££ Bflkkell/ 770 P.2d 
at 991; State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d [1203,] 1205 [(Utah 1984)]; 
State v. Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)." 
Id. 
B. Defendant's "Particularity" Challenge Fails 
for Lack of Legal Argument or Authority 
Defendant argues that the authority-granting paragraph is 
constitutionally deficient because it * [did not] give a 
particularized description of the 'outbuildings, curtilage, 
vehicles or persons present' that are also subject to the 
search." However, defendant on appeal entirely fails to develop 
with argument or legal authority that these terms are 
constitutionally deficient. Therefore, the Court should decline 
to consider the argument on appeal. See State v. Amicone. 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule on issue 
unsupported by any argument or legal authority). Therefore, this 
Court should decline to consider defendant's claim that the 
authority-granting clause of the warrant lacked particularity. 
C. Under Covington, the Affidavit Supplied 
Probable Cause Justifying the Issuance 
of an "All Persons Present" Warrant 
In Covington, this Court recognized that " [a]s a general 
rule • . . %open-ended or general warrants are constitutionally 
prohibited."' ggvingtOfl/ 274 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23 (citing Ybarra 
v. Illinois. 44 U.S. 85, 92 n.4# 100 S. Ct. 338, 342 n.4 
11 
(1979)).3 Nevertheless, this Court affirmed the validity of an 
uall persons present" search warrant because the affidavit in 
that case established probable cause that everyone present at the 
premises at the time of the search would be engaged in illegal 
conduct. Id. at 22-25 (citing State v. De Simone. 288 A.2d 849, 
850 (N.J. 1972), for the proposition that ^[If] there is good 
reason to suspect or believe that anyone present at the 
anticipated scene will probably be a participant, presence 
becomes the descriptive fact satisfying the [specificity 
requirement] of the Fourth Amendment"). 
This court then went on to cite numerous examples of search 
warrants which were upheld because the facts established wa 
sufficient nexus between the criminal activity, the place of the 
activity, and the persons at the place." Id. at 22. The Court 
announced three factors it considered particularly relevant in 
3
 Defendant inappropriately cites Ybarra and State v. 
Jackson. 873 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1994), in his challenge to the 
validity of the warrant. In Ybarra, the challenged warrant 
authorized only the search of a bar and the barkeeper. Ybarra. 444 
U.S. at 88. In Jackson, the warrant authorized a search of "all 
persons living in the residence." Jackson. 873 P.2d at 1166. 
Thus, neither Ybarra nor Jackson, were cases dealing with "all 
persons present" warrants. Moreover, both Covington and authority 
on which it relied noted that Ybarra expressly contemplated the 
possibility that in other circumstances wall persons present" 
warrants were constitutionally valid if supported by probable cause 
that unnamed persons on the premises would possess contraband. See 
Covington. 274 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25 n.l; People v. Johnson. 805 
P.2d 1156, 1159 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (cited by Covington. 274 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 24) . S&S. also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 4.5(e), 231 n. 114 (2nd ed. 1987) (same). 
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assessing the underlying affidavit for probable cause to search 
all persons present: 
[1] the premises or area to be searched are 
small, confined and private [as opposed to a 
public or guasi\public place where casual 
presence of persons for myriad of noncriminal 
reasons is to be expected]; [2] the nature of 
the criminal activity is such that the 
participants (in general) constantly shift or 
change so that it is, practically, impossible 
for the police to predict that any specific 
person or persons will be on the premises at 
any given time; and [3] the items 
specifically described in the warrant as the 
target of the search are of a size or kind 
which renders them easily and likely to be 
concealed on the person. 
Id. at 24 (citing Smith. 348 N.E.2d at 105-06). 
Applying these tests the Court found that the affidavit 
established probable cause to search Covington, who was found 
just outside a basement apartment from which drugs were being 
sold. Particularly, the affidavit stated that a woman, arrested 
with methamphetamine on her person, told police that she had 
stolen the drugs from her supplier, a man known to have a 
substantial history of involvement with controlled substances and 
who had bindles ready for sale; that she had smoked 
methamphetamine with her supplier that day at his residence; that 
the supplier resided in a basement apartment at a specified 
address; that law enforcement had received tips from a number of 
sources that the supplier had been selling methamphetamine during 
the year and within the preceding three weeks; and that based on 
attesting officer's experience, persons on the premises would 
13 
likely have in their possession small bindles of drugs which 
could easily be hidden or destroyed. Id. at 24-25. 
While the affidavit in this case does not reference the 
extended criminal activity evident in Covington, it nonetheless 
provides probable cause to believe that individuals present at 
the time of execution of the warrant would be involved in 
narcotics offenses: The affidavit states that on September 21, 
1994, about six weeks before the warrant was sought on November 
9, 1994, Provo Police received an anonymous phone call indicating 
that the Steven and Angela Hundley, living at 255 N. 1600 W. #121 
in Provo, were using and selling cocaine (R. 28); that the caller 
also indicated that Steven Hundley was dealing drugs heavily at 
Mountain States Steel, his place of employment (R. 28); that in 
October, 1994 a confidential informant, known to Officer Harper, 
the attesting officer, to have been previously reliable, 
corroborated the fact that Steven Hundley was selling cocaine (R. 
28); that on November 7, 1994, two days before the warrant 
issued, Provo City Police officers searched the Hundley's trash 
can, finding methamphetamine paraphernalia with residue, 
marijuana leaves and stems, syringes, baggies and butane fuel 
canisters (R. 28); that the amounts of methamphetamine residue 
and marijuana implied small amounts for use (R. 27); that such 
drug paraphernalia can be nquickly and easily hidden in the 
clothing or be destroyed if intent is given to search" and that 
controlled substances and paraphernalia are often kept in 
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outlying vehicles and buildings (R. 27); that in the attesting 
officer's experience persons involved with the illegal use of 
marijuana and methamphetamine generally sell such substances and 
that he expected to find additional controlled substances as well 
as evidence related to production and distribution (R. 27); and 
that the Hundley's residence was a single-wide mobile home 
located at the address mentioned by the anonymous caller (R. 27). 
Following the criteria set out in Smith, the affidavit 
identifies a sufficient nexus between the Hundley's criminal 
activity, their residence, and defendant, who appeared on the 
premises at the time of the search. First, the single-wide 
trailer is precisely the "small, confined and private" place 
which by its physical limitation gives notice to anyone on the 
premises of whatever activity is on-going, as distinguished from 
a large public place where people may reasonably gather for a 
variety of purposes without being aware of any clandestine 
criminal activity. See De Simone, 288 A.2d at 850 
(distinguishing the notice of illegal activity given by a dice 
game in a barn, as opposed to a sale of lottery slips in a 
department store or an industrial plant). Apparently defendant 
was no stranger to the premises, since he appears to have 
entered the trailer of his own accord without formality (R. 116). 
Secondly, drug dealing is by its nature an activity in which the 
participants are constantly shifting, so that it is impossible to 
know which buyer will be on the premises at any given time. 
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Thirdly, the affidavit specifically states that small amounts of 
methamphetamine residue and marijuana were located in the garbage 
can, that such substances could be packaged in 1/8 ounce baggies 
or bindles and that they could be easily and quickly destroyed or 
concealed if a search were imminent. The affidavit identified 
substantial evidence that drugs were being sold from the trailer, 
based on evidence that Steven Hundley was dealing cocaine heavily 
at his place of employment, that both he and his wife were using 
and selling cocaine, and that residue of controlled substances 
and baggies, clear evidence of on-going distribution, were found 
in the garbage can only two days before the warrant issued. 
Finally, as a basis for the "all persons present" warrant, the 
attesting officer, with fifteen years of experience, stated that 
since in his experience sales would be made from the premises, 
persons on the premises would likely conceal or destroy the 
contraband. 
The trial court concluded that the authority-granting 
paragraph of the warrant was neither vague nor overbroad and that 
the magistrate had the constitutional right to issue a warrant 
"which calls for the search of . . . the persons of any 
individuals present at the time of the execution of the warrant" 
(R. 68). Given that the magistrate need find only a "fair 
probability" from the affidavit and surrounding circumstances 
that evidence of illegal conduct will be found on the premises to 
be searched, this Court should find under the standards set out 
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in Covington that the trial court properly held the warrant 
constitutional. 
POINT II 
THE WARRANT WAS EXECUTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
In his final point defendant asserts that even if a "general 
warrant," i.e., an "all persons present" warrant meets 
constitutional requirements, an unreasonable search may result if 
it is executed beyond the scope of its authorization. 
Particularly, defendant claims that he was searched after the 
time in which the warrant was being executed. Appellant's Br. at 
16-17. Thereafter, defendant cites authority requiring 
independent probable cause to search an individual, 
notwithstanding the issuance of a valid warrant. Appellant's Br. 
at 18. He concludes by arguing that because there was no 
independent probable cause justifying his search on the premises, 
any evidence found as a result of the alleged impermissible 
search must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
Appellant's Br. at 18-19. The argument seriously misapprehends 
the applicable legal standards. 
Pe Simons, upon which Covington and all of its cited 
authority rely, makes plain that the independent probable cause 
which establishes with particularity that any given individual on 
certain premises will likely be involved in criminal activity is 
not established by specifically identifying the defendant in the 
affidavit. Rather, it is any defendant's connection to the 
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patent criminal activity on given premises that establishes 
probable cause--"presence becomes the descriptive fact satisfying 
the aim of the Fourth Amendment." De Simone. 288 A.2d at 850. 
In spite of his relying on authority that find sufficient 
probable cause as to any given person in the unique circumstances 
supporting a valid "all persons present" warrant, without any 
further particularized showing as to a given defendant, defendant 
fails to appreciate the distinction made in those cases. See 
Appellant's Br. at 14-16, 18. Not surprisingly, no authority 
cited by defendant concerns "all persons present" warrants, but 
rather warrants whose proper execution would require a showing of 
individualized probable cause. See Jackson, 873 P.2d at 1166 
(warrant authorizing search of uall persons living in the 
residence"); State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Utah 1986) (no-
knock warrant to search residence, evidently without authority to 
search all persons present); Knight v, State, 566 So.2d 8, 8 
(Fla. App. 1990) (warrant authorizing search of premises and of 
"all persons therein who shall be participating in said criminal 
activity"). Therefore, none of such authority is relevant to the 
resolution of the issues on appeal. 
Defendant contends that because he appeared on the scene 
between forty and seventy-five minutes after the police had begun 
executing the warrant, and after the Hundleys were arrested, they 
and their child transported and the video cameras put away, that 
he was not on the premises at the time of the execution of the 
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warrant. Appellant's Br. at 17. However, the only authority 
that defendant cites seems rather to support the contrary 
position. See Knight. 566 So.2d at 8-9 (noting that although the 
"search was almost complete," the "warrant was being executed"). 
Moreover, common sense dictates that while the police are still 
on premises pursuant to the warrant, the warrant is being 
executed. In this case the record shows that evidence was still 
being packed up when defendant arrived (R. 90-92). The trial 
court held that the execution of the warrant only terminates when 
the officers leave, until which time the officers had authority, 
under the warrant, to search a person entering the property (R. 
68). Nothing in defendant's argument or the record suggests that 
this conclusion was incorrect. 
Finally, defendant challenges the search of the car as fruit 
of the poisonous tree resulting from the alleged unconstitutional 
search of his person. In this case defendant entered the 
Hundley's trailer, was searched, arrested and then handcuffed, 
after which the car was searched (R. 115-16). In the car police 
found defendant's jacket containing methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia (R. 85, 99, 103), which form the basis of the 
charge to which defendant pleaded guilty (R. 57). 
In its written conclusions the trial court held that *[t]he 
fact that defendant had drug paraphernalia on his person gives 
the police the right to search that vehicle to make a 
determination if there are any further drugs" (R. 68). At the 
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hearing the trial court had also stated that "[o]nce 
[defendant's] placed under arrest [the police] certainly have the 
right to [search that vehicle to make a determination if there is 
[sic] any further drugs]" (R. 156). 
It is evident that the trial court considered the ensuing 
search of the car a lawful search incident to an arrest. 
Defendant nowhere challenges this theory in the trial court, 
which is undoubtedly correct in the circumstances. See State v. 
Kent. 665 P.2d 1317, 1317-18 (Utah 1983) (upholding search 
incident to arrest where defendant was arrested and detained in 
the presence of ten police officers); State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 
769, 783-85 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (1991) 
(upholding search of a diaper bag containing a gun incident to 
arrest of a homicide suspect). Further, the initial search was 
constitutionally sound, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine 
does not apply. Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial 
court's ruling that the police had the authority to search the 
car following defendant's arrest. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 
Given the fact sensitivity of determinations of probable 
cause generally and the lack of Utah cases dealing with the 
application of Covington in determining probable cause in 
particular, the State believes that this Court's decision-making 
process would be aided by oral argument and that .the publishing 
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of a full written opinion in this case would be useful in 
developing this area of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress and judgment of conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ?4 day of November, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
^<ju«r>*-^^<--erx
-< 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIMNO 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Margaret P. Lindsay and Michael E. Jewell, Utah County Public 
Defenders Assoc, attorneys for defendant, 40 South 100 West, 
Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601, this -7^ day of November, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 E. CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STFVFN HTTNni.FY 
ANGELA HUNDLEY 
755 N. 16TDTr-Wr-^121 
PROVO, UT 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
A SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No, 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
:ss, 
) 
Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have 
been a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the 
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class. During 
the time I have been a peace officer I have received over 225 hours 
of specialized training for law enforcement work including 185 
hours of training specific to narcotics work. Narcotics classes I 
have taken include training in surveillance, operation of 
surveillance and electronic investigatory equipment, field testing 
of drugs and drug recognition. As an officer I have participated 
in hundreds of operations involving the undercover purchase of 
narcotics and/or the arrest of person for substance abuse related 
violations. I have experience working undercover' providing first 
hand experience with narcotics trafficking. I have supervised 
narcotics investigations for the Provo Police Department since 
1992. I am currently designated as the department 
trainer/specialist in the areas of fingerprinting, surveillance, 
video equipment, narcotics and drug recognition. 
& & & % ov 
f/tfllf 
2. On Sept. 21, 1994 Lt. Dave Bolda of the Provo City Police 
Department received an anonymous phone call that Defendants are 
using and selling cocaine. The caller indicated Defendants1 
address as being 255 N. 1600 W. #121, Provo, Utah, Utah County, 
The anonymous caller also indicated that Defendant Steven Hundley 
is dealing heavily at his place of employment, that being Mountain 
States Steel. 
3. That during the month of October, 1994 Officer Jensen of 
the Provo City Police Department received information from a 
Confidential Informant that Defendant Steven Hundley is selling 
cocaine. 
4. Your affiant believes the Confidential Informant who 
spoke to Officer Jensen to be reliable in that the Confidential 
Informant has supplied law enforcement with information in the past 
that has proven reliable. 
5. Provo City has a solid waste collection system. Each 
home is assigned a specific can which is owned by the City. An 
additional can may be obtained for an additional fee. Once per 
week, the cans are to be placed at curbside or in the street for 
collection. A City truck then mechanically picks up and empties 
the can. 
6. That on Nov. 7, 1994 in the early morning hours, your 
affiant and other officers responded to the residence located at 
255 N. 1600 W. #121 in Provo. There was one can placed in the 
street for collection at that location with the numeral "121" 
stencilled on the side. Your affiant took the can to the Provo 
Police Department where the contents were reviewed. After your 
affiant finished, the remaining contents were placed in the can and 
the can returned to the street in front of the residence at 255 N. 
1600 W. #121. 
7. Within the can, officers found paraphernalia associated 
with the ingestion of methamphetamine. A chemical reagent test was 
used on a piece of paraphernalia, that being a piece of charred 
glass, which showed positive for methamphetamine. Also found in 
the garbage were marijuana stems and leaf fragments. A chemical 
reagent test was used on a leaf fragment which showed positive for 
marijuana. Other parts of paraphernalia found were syringes, 
baggies, and butane fuel canisters. Also found in the garbage was 
correspondence listing the address 255 N. 1600 W. #121 and also 
listing the names Steven Hundley and Angie Hundley. 
if" « 
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8. The amounts of residue and marijuana in the garbage 
imply small amounts for use. Such amounts of marijuana and 
methamphetamine are typically packaged in baggies of 1/8 oz. or 
less for marijuana, and one gram bindles for methamphetamine, quite 
small in volume. Such baggies and bindles can quickly and easily 
be hidden in the clothing or be destroyed if intent is given to 
search. Moreover, it is your affiant's experience that persons 
with a potentially violent disposition may react with violence if 
confronted with a search. One of the side effects of 
methamphetamine use is an increase in violent behavior. Entry 
without notice allows officers to secure the residence and secure 
officer safety. 
9. Marijuana, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia are often 
kept in outlying vehicles and buildings. Failure to search the 
curtilage of the residence, together with the person of individuals 
present, and vehicles located on the curtilage at the time of the 
execution of the search, will likely result in officers missing 
important evidence. 
10. It is your affiant's experience that most of the people 
I have encountered with the unlawful use of 
marijuana/methamphetamine also occasionally sell, sometimes paying 
for their use with profits from sales. It is so common as to be 
the rule rather than the exception, to find evidence related to 
production and/or distribution when controlled substances are 
located in a residence. 
11. The residence is more particularly described as a single-
wide mobile home located at 255 N. 1600 W. , Provo, Utah. The 
mobile home is in the south end of the mobile park located on a 
corner, that corner being a south west corner. The mobile home is 
cream colored with brown trim with the main entrance facing south. 
The numerals "121" are located on the east side and the south side 
of the mobile home. 
12. Your affiant expects to locate additional controlled 
substances in the residence, together with associated 
paraphernalia, including items used or capable of being used for 
the storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana and 
methamphetamine. 
Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by 
this court authorizing the search of the mobile home, together with 
the curtilage and the person of all individuals present within the 
home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at said residence at 
the time of search for presence of controlled substances together 
with associated paraphernalia including items used or capable of 
being used for the storage, use, production or distribution of 
controlled substances to be executed without notice of intent or 
authority in the daytime. 
Of & Ah\K**be^ A 
Dated this { day of Oofeobar 1994 A.M. 
per 
cial Investigations 
7^ yi^ Subscribed and sworn before me on the ' day of 
iJo^^yyU^^ 1994, ? • Y ^ , ££.M. 
MAGISTRATE 
ADDENDUM B 
KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 EAST CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN 
ANGELA 
255 N. 
PROVO, 
HUNDLEY 
HUNDLEY 
1600 W. 
UT 
: SEARCH WARRANT 
: Criminal No. 
#121 
Defendants 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Magistrates It has been established by oath or 
Endorsement affirmation made or submitted to me this 
/ day of November, 1994 that there is 
probable cause to believe the following: 
1. The property described below: 
was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed; 
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of 
an offense; or 
^ > 
4& 
is evidence of illegal conduct. 
2. The property described below is most probably 
located at the premises also set forth below. 
3. The person or entity in possession of the property 
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct. 
4. That this warrant may be served without notice of 
intent or authority to search, due to the fact that 
the property to be searched for may be easily 2 5 
secreted, disposed of, or destroyed if notice of 
intent to search is given. f* ^ P O V E R Y C^N 
5- That this warrant may be served in the day time 
hours. 
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to conduct 
a search of the a residence described as a single-wide mobile home 
located at 255 N. 1600 W. , Provo, Utah. The mobile home is in the 
south end of the mobile park located on a corner, that corner being 
a south west corner. The mobile home is cream colored with brown 
trim with the main entrance facing south. The numerals "121" are 
located on the east side and the south side of the mobile home. 
Your are also hereby directed to search of any outbuildings, 
curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any individuals present at 
the time of the execution of this warrant. 
You are directed to search for the presence of the following 
property: controlled substances, together with associated 
paraphernalia, including items used or capable of being used for 
the storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana and 
methamphetamine. 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring 
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the 
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You 
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person 
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where 
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with 
a written inventory of any property seized identifying the place 
where the property is being held. 
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE 
OF ISSUANCE. 
DATED this j day of November, 1994, 
MAGISTRATE 
&0T 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE FOURT4f^qJ^R<fe?l5'¥^COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OFijteCHH^OREM DEPARTMENT 
^n^r Oriairia1 STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
SHANE DOYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. 941-1347 
<?4/</oo V°i 
Defendant• 
Preliminary Hearing 
Electronically recorded on 
December 15, 1994 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JOSEPH I, DIMICK 
Fourth Circuit Court Judge 
APPEARANCES: 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
Craia Madsen 
Deputy County Attorney 
100 East Center Street 
Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801)370-8 026 
Michael Jewell 
Utah County Public Defender 
40 South 100 West 
Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801)379-2570 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
CENTER COURT REPORTING 
P. O. BOX 1786 
PROVO, UTAH 84603-1786 
TELEPHONE: (801)224-9847 
RLED 
JUN 2 9 1995 
• J v 'J 
COURT OF APPEALS 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on December 15, 1994) 
THE COURT: Let's move on to State versus 
Shane Doyle, Is the defense ready? 
MR. JEWELL: We are, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is the State? 
MR. MADSEN: Yes, we are. 
THE COURT: Anything preliminary? 
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, I think that we'd 
ask the Court to invoke the exclusionary rule at 
this time. 
THE COURT: Would you call your witnesses, 
please. 
MR. MADSEN: Devon Jensen, Russ Billings, 
Denton Johnston, Shawn Adamson. I believe that's 
all. 
THE COURT: Who are you going to call 
first? 
MR. MADSEN: Denton Johnston. 
THE COURT: Do you want anybody for 
assistance? 
MR. MADSEN: When he's finished I'll have 
him remain. 
THE COURT: I want to ask the other three 
of you to stay out of earshot and not to discuss 
•~-0 8 1 
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the case while you're out. Thank you. 
MR. MADSEN: State calls Denton Johnston. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that 
the testimony you're about to give in the case now 
pending before this Court will be the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
MR. MADSEN: Can I question him seated 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Sure. 
DENTON JOHNSTON, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MADSEN: 
Q. Will you please state your full name and 
your occupation. 
A. My name is Denton Johnston. I'm a police 
sergeant for the City of Orem. 
Q, Did you assist in the execution of a 
search warrant on the 11th day of November of this 
year at approximately 5 o'clock (inaudible)? 
A. I did. 
Q. Where did that take place? 
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A. It took place at 255 North 1600 West in 
Provo at trailer No. 121. 
THE COURT: Say again. 
THE WITNESS: It was at 255 North 1600 
West, trailer No. 121 in Provo. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Q. BY MR. MADSEN: Did your warrant include 
vehicles of individuals present during the 
execution of the warrant? 
A. Yes, it did. 
MR. JEWELL: Objection, your Honor. Did he 
have the warrant present (inaudible). 
THE COURT: I didn't hear the question. 
MR. MADSEN: The warrant provided for the 
search of the vehicles of any individuals present 
during the execution of the warrant. 
THE COURT: And your objection. 
MR. JEWELL: My objection it's hearsay. 
The warrant speaks for itself. 
THE COURT: Well, at a hearing where the 
content of the warrant could be suppressed and 
where the results received from it could be 
suppressed I think that's a pretty good motion. 
For preliminary hearing I think it's a short forum 
that it's okay. Your answer. 
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Q. What was inside the jacket? 
A. Inside the jacket there was what I 
determined to be drug paraphernalia* There was a 
small butane canister. Along with the butane 
canister there was a small pencil-like butane 
torch. There was also a cassette tape that at that 
time I passed over. There was a -- I believe that 
was all the paraphernalia that I located within the 
jacket. 
Q. Were you able to determine to whom the 
jacket belonged? 
A. Yes, there was also a note inside the 
jacket addressed to Shane. I questioned Ms. Olsen 
about whose jacket it was. She said that it was 
Shane Doyle's. 
Q. Now, is the person you're identifying as 
Shane Doyle, is he present here in the courtroom? 
A. Yes, he is. 
Q, Where is he? 
A. He's at the defendant's table. 
Q. To your knowledge was there any other 
property removed from the vehicle, particularly the 
passenger's side? 
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. Who was driving the vehicle? 
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A. Ms. Olsen, Teri Olsen. 
Q. On the passenger's side what else did you 
locate? 
A. There was a package of cigarettes or a 
cigarette pack itself. I don't recall if there was 
actually cigarettes in it. There was a marijuana 
pipe found inside it. 
Q. Any marijuana inside the bag? 
A. I don't recall if there was any marijuana 
in there. 
MR. MADSEN: That's all the questions, your 
Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEWELL: 
Q. Officer Johnston, who went with you to 
execute the warrant? 
A. There was my myself, Sergeant Jerry 
Harper, Officer Russ Billings, Officer Devon 
Jensen, Shawn Adamson. There was two uniforms from 
Provo City who I don't recall their names. 
Q. Now, did this group of people that you 
just named, did you all go over together to execute 
the warrant? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. How was this accomplished? Did someone 
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knock on the door? How did you give notice that a 
warrant was to be executed? 
A, We pulled up in a van. We were all 
loaded in a van and pulled up to the front door. 
Detective Shawn Adamson and Detective Andre Leavitt 
-- who I just recall was with us also -- went to 
the door, knocked on the door. 
Once the door was opened they gave us a 
visual signal. At that time we opened the door to 
the van and rushed in and did the cursory search 
and secured the trailer house. 
Q. Okay. Now, at what time did the van pull 
up to the house? 
A. I don't recall the exact time. 
THE COURT: After you arrived? 
THE WITNESS: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: After you arrived? 
THE WITNESS: The van? 
MR. JEWELL: Oh, I'm sorry. No, I'm 
talking about the van the officers were in 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q. BY MR. JEWELL: What time did you guys, you 
the officers pull up to the house? 
A. I don't recall the times. It was 
•OuO 87 
10 
approximately 1700, 5 o'clock in the evening. 
Q. Okay, and when you rushed into the house 
-- after you'd been given the signal and you rushed 
into the house, who was present inside the house? 
A. It was Steve Hundley and his wife Angie 
Hundley. 
Q. Was there anyone else present besides 
Mr. and Mrs. Hundley? 
A. I believe there was a small child there. 
Q. No other adults present; is that right? 
A. No, there was no other adults present at 
that time. 
Q. At that time did you begin searching the 
home? 
A. My primary responsibility once the trailer 
was secured was to videotape the suspects that we 
were going to arrest and videotape any evidence. 
As far as searching, I didn't participate in any of 
the searching of the trailer. 
Q. Was the warrant itself actually handed to 
one of the two adult Hundleys at that time? 
A. I don't recall who had the warrant in 
hand. I believe Sergeant Jerry Harper was the 
affiant. He was responsible to actually physically 
take the warrant inside the house and give it to 
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the occupants. I didn't do it. 
THE COURT: Is that something you taped? 
THE WITNESS: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: Is that something you videoed? 
THE WITNESS: No, it was not. 
Q. BY MR. JEWELL: Now, after you entered into 
the home after being given the visual signal, how 
much time elapsed between that and when the 
automobile driven by Ms. Olsen arrived? 
A. It was probably an hour, an hour and 15 
minutes. We were almost concluded with the search 
of the trailer when Mr. Doyle and Ms. Olsen 
arrived. 
Q. So you believe an hour, an hour and 15 
minutes would be about how much time elapsed 
between your entry into the trailer and when the 
car with Ms. Olsen and Mr. Doyle arrived; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q* Okay. Do you have a copy of your report 
in front of you? 
A* Yes, I do. 
Q. Okay. Now, at the time when you wrote 
this report how much time after you went on this 
search warrant did you write up this report? 
r> r\ 
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A. It was probably the next day. 
Q. So would you term what you wrote on the 
14th fairly accurate, pretty close in time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. I'd like to draw your attention to 
paragraph two of that report, the first sentence. 
No, third paragraph, I'm sorry. The first 
sentence. Could you read that for us, please. 
A. At the completion of the search warrant 
two other individuals arrived at the home. A Shane 
Doyle and a Teri Olsen arrived. 
Q. Would you say that's accurate? 
A. Well, as I stated before, we were almost 
completed with the warrant. We were getting the 
evidence packed up and getting ready to leave. 
Making arrangements for having someone to pick up 
the child because we were taking Mr. and Mrs. 
Hundley into custody. 
Q. Had they already been arrested and removed 
from the home at that point? 
A. Okay. I don't recall if they had been 
transported yet or not. They had been placed under 
arrest at that time -- by that time, yes. 
Q. But you're not sure whether or not they 
had actually been removed from the home at this 
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point, right? 
A. Right. I don't know if the uniforms had 
taken them and transported them or not. 
Q. Did you videotape the arrival of this 
automobile driven by Ms. Olsen? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you at any point videotape either 
Ms. Olsen or Mr. Doyle? 
A. I don't believe I did. I don't believe 
so. 
Q. Had you already put away the video camera 
by that point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had any of the officers left the scene by 
the time that Mr. Doyle and Ms. Olsen arrived? 
A* No, not that I know of. I don't recall 
any. We had two vehicles. There was Sergeant 
Blackhurst's Blazer and a van. Those officers that 
came in the van were all still there. I don't 
recall if Sergeant Blackhurst had left by then or 
not. 
Q. Had any of the evidence been removed from 
the scene at the time they arrived? 
A. No, it hadn't. No, it had not. 
Q. And as far as the child, had the child 
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been removed at that point? 
A. No, it had not. 
Q. Okay. Could I have you come up here, if 
you wouldn't mind, to the board and just diagram 
the trailer, where your van was parked and where 
the automobile arrived. 
THE COURT: You can tell us what you're 
drawing as you're doing it. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. This is inside the 
Lamplighter -- I believe it's called the Lamp -- or 
commonly known as the Lamplighter Trailer Park. I 
don't know the exact street designations for these 
two streets. 
The Lamplighter, itself, that trailer park 
is the address 255 North 1600 West. It's just 
trailer No. 121. It sits on the east/west type 
access. This road, I believe, comes down into a 
culdesac with additional trailers sitting on it. 
We came in here. Sergeant Blackhurst 
parked his Blazer here. We drove the van around 
here and stopped and waited. Detective Leavitt, 
Detective Adamson was the passenger and the driver 
of the vehicle. The rest of us were in the back of 
the van. 
Ms. Olsen and Mr. Doyle pulled up in a 
r^ -\ 
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L white Ford Escort parked in front of this other 
l\ trailer 
1 south of 
i Q -
right here. So they were parked to the 
the van. 
BY MR. JEWELL: Okay. Could you indicate 
J which entrance was used by the officers who went 
> to knock 
1 A* 
M was kind 
u locked si 
i Q . 
that one 
trailer, 
officers' 
A. 
Q. 
on the door. 
This entrance here. This entrance here 
of a -- I don't recall if it was bolted 
hut. It wasn't a functional entrance. 
So that entrance you've just indicated, 
that would be on the south end of the 
that was the entrance used by all 
p 
Yes. 
Now, as far as any fencing or markings, 
there any fencing around that particular trailer 
indicate 
trailer? 
A* 
that this is the property owned by that 
I don't recall if there was a fence here 
in 
or 
is 
to 
. I 
I know there's not a fence here. On the south side 
of 121 there's not a fence (inaudible). 
Q* Now, as far as the — you've marked the 
Escort as being directly in front of the trailer, 
just to the south of the Hundley Residence. 
A. 1 That's what I said, yes. Right. 
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Q. And which way was it facing? 
A. It was facing south, like that. Our 
vehicle was also facing south. 
Q. Are there markings on the curbs for which 
trailer is which, or are the markings actually on 
the trailers themselves? 
A. The markings are on the trailers 
themselves. There are no markings on the road 
surface to designate an address or anything like 
that. It's just a -- you know, it's a smooth road, 
is all that is there. 
Q. Now, as far as mailboxes, are the 
mailboxes on the trailers or are they in front of 
the trailers? 
A. I don't recall where the mailboxes are at, 
or even if -- I don't know if this trailer has a 
common area for mail to walk down to, or whether 
the mail is delivered directly to the trailers 
themselves• 
Q. Now, what about the actual parking for the 
owners or tenants of the trailer? Do they park 
next to the trailer or do they have to park up the 
street also? 
h. They can park in -- there's a pad between 
each of the trailers where the occupants or the 
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tenants 
Q. 
be just 
A. 
be to th 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
can park their vehicles. 
So the pad for the Hundley trailer 
south? 
Yeah, it's right here. I guess it 
e south. 
The southeast of the trailer? 
Southeast• 
Okay, and then just south of that 
the neighbor's trailer? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
122 or -
Yes, this is another trailer here. 
And that would be -- was that No. 
would 
would 
would be 
122? 
I don't recall what it is. Whether it was 
- trailer parks have a tendency to 
their own pattern when they set it up. 
Q. 
trailer 
A. 
this pad 
limited 
the curb 
Q. 
curb on 
A. 
Q-
a common 
And then the pad for the neighbor' 
is just the south of that trailer a 
have 
s 
ISO? 
Yeah, this pad would go to this trailer, 
would go to this trailer. It was 
space (inaudible) between the trail 
on the north side. 
How much space between the trailer 
the east side? 
Eight to ten feet. 
Now, that street that's in front, 
area street? 
very 
er and 
and the 
is that 
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A, This right here? 
Q. Uh-huh. 
A. Yeah, it's an access street because you 
have trailers back here. 
Q. And how many trailers would you estimate 
are in that area? 
A. One, two, three, four, five, six. There 
would probably be seven trailers in this including 
(inaudible). 
Q. And were there street lights over that 
area? Was it in the day or night? I'm sorry. 
A. We entered during the daylight hours. We 
(inaudible) when it was dark. I recall there was a 
street light over here, and I recall that there 
possibly was a street light down here at the end of 
the culdesac that was lit when we left. This area 
by the trailer itself was quite dark. 
Q. Were there other cars parked along the 
street at that time that the Doyle pulled up? 
A. I recall another car sitting in front of 
the Ford Escort. There was another vehicle or 
something there, a trailer of some sort parked in 
the street. 
Q. And that was parked -- was that there when 
the Escort pulled up? The Escort pulled up behind 
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that; is that what you're saying? 
A, No. What I'm saying is it was there when 
I came out and searched the vehicle, 
Q. Is that right? 
A. There was another vehicle or a trailer. 
There was something there in front of the Escort. 
Q. Was that vehicle searched? 
A. No, it was not. 
Q. Do you know who the owner of that vehicle 
was? 
A. I do not. 
MR. JEWELL: I don't believe I have any 
further questions, your Honor. 
MR. MADSEN: No more questions, your Honor. 
The State calls Devon Jensen. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that 
the testimony you are about to give in the case now 
pending before this Court will be the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
DEVON JENSEN. 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
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BY MR. MADSEN: 
Q. Would you please state your full name and 
occupation. 
A. Devon Jensen. I'm a police officer for 
Provo City. 
Q, Now, did you participate in the search of 
the Hundley's trailer on the 11th day of November 
of this year? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Pursuant to that were you there when a 
vehicle arrived operated by Ms. Olsen in which 
Mr. Shane Doyle was a passenger? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. When did you first see Ms. Olsen and 
Mr. Doyle? 
A. When they came to the door while we were 
executing a search warrant inside. 
Q. Subsequent to that contact did you have 
occasion to examine the contents of the jacket that 
was described as Mr. Doyle's? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you ever examine any of the items that 
were removed from it? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you remember seeing a cassette case 
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either in the vehicle or outside the trailer? 
A. Yes, I found a cassette case on the 
passenger floor of the vehicle. 
Q. Do you know who put it there? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Did you examine the cassette case? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you examine the contents? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was inside? 
A. Three plastic bags which contained 
methamphetamine. 
Q. Were they field tested? 
A. Yes, they were. 
Q. Tested positive? 
A. Yes, they were. 
MR. MADSEN: I have no other questions, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Would you describe the location 
of the cassette case as you found it. 
THE WITNESS: It was on the passenger floor 
of the vehicle. It was a Ford Escort. 
THE COURT: You looked there after this 
vehicle had been entered by others or were you 
looking? 
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THE WITNESS: Detective Johnston and 
Adamson had already been looking through the 
vehicle when I went and looked and found the 
cassette. 
THE COURT: Had they discontinued their 
search when you began yours? 
THE WITNESS: I believe they were still 
searching and interviewing the female at the time 
when I went out and assisted them in searching the 
vehicle. 
THE COURT: What does "on the floor" mean? 
Under something or --
THE WITNESS: No, it was just in front of 
the seat on the floor. 
THE COURT: Front and center in plain 
view? 
THE WITNESS: In the passenger plain view. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEWELL: 
Q. Now, Officer Jensen, you indicated you 
were not the first person to search the vehicle. 
A. No, I was not. 
Q. And who were the two officers that you 
mentioned that had searched the vehicle before you 
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had? 
A. Detective Johnston and Adamson had already 
found some items of controlled substance and 
paraphernalia and so forth in the vehicle. 
Q. But it was you who located this cassette 
that you've described? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this type of vehicle, is there a bench 
seat or are they bucket seats? 
A. They are bucket seats. 
Q. Two-door or four-door? 
A. I don't recall. I believe it was two-door 
with a hatchback. 
Q. And when you entered the vehicle to search 
through it, which door of the vehicle did you 
enter? 
A. The driver's. 
Q. And from that perspective of the driver's 
side did you notice the cassette on the floor? 
A. Yes, I was kneeling on the front driver's 
seat looking under the seats and around, when I 
picked up the cassette and found the baggies 
inside• 
Q. Now, this cassette was described on the 
floor. Was it underneath the floor mat or was it 
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in plain view? 
A. It was in plain view, 
Q. And what was the cover of the cassette --
excuse me. If the cassette cover were not open, 
what would it read on the outside? Was it a music 
group or something like that? 
A. No, it wasn't a music group. It was a --
I don't recall the brand name, but it had the 
regular package of a cassette, the paper on the 
outside, so you couldn't view the contents inside. 
It wasn't clear. It had a paper lining in it. 
Once I opened that, there wasn't a cassette in it 
and I found the three baggies of meth in them. 
Q. So what you're saying is like it was a 
type of cassette, Sony or whatever? 
A. Yeah, something like that. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure I understand. Was 
it an actual cassette? 
THE WITNESS: It was a cassette case. 
THE COURT: It was a case, not a cassette. 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
Q. BY MR. JEWELL: Now, in finding this item, 
you opened it. Then after that point you found 
something inside? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And what did you remove from inside that 
container? 
A. There were three baggies which contained a 
powdered substance that field tested positive for 
methamphetamines. 
Q. Did you yourself conduct that field test? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Who did conduct that field test? 
A. Officer Billings. 
Q. Did you ever fingerprint the cassette 
casing that you've described? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Was anything found on Mr. Doyle which 
indicated that he had any kind ownership of that 
cassette? Maybe another cassette with the same 
brand name on it or anything? 
A. Not to my knowledge. I didn't have any 
contact with Mr. Doyle in searching him. 
Q. Did you question Mr. Doyle at all? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you videotape anything at the scene? 
A. No, I did not. 
MR. JEWELL: I don't have any further 
questions for this witness. 
MR. MADSEN: Nothing further, your Honor. 
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I might briefly recall Detective Johnston, 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Denton Johnston retakes the witness stand) 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MADSEN: 
Q. I remind you, Detective Johnston, you're 
still under oath. You testified earlier about 
finding a cassette case inside the coat; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you do with it? 
A. Set it on the floor of the vehicle. Set 
it on the floorboards of the car. 
Q. Did you see the cassette case after the 
meth was removed from it? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Was that the same one you removed? 
A. It was the same one. 
MR. MADSEN: I have no more questions. 
THE COURT: I didn't follow that. You 
discovered it first? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, it was in the 
jacket pocket with the rest of the paraphernalia, 
but I overlooked it as paraphernalia. Did not look 
inside, open the case up and look inside. I set 
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it down on the floorboard, went back to looking 
through the jacket. 
THE COURT: Did you find the jacket in the 
car 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I did. 
THE COURT: Where? 
THE WITNESS: It was in between the two 
seats 
THE COURT: Between bucket seats? 
THE WITNESS: Between the bucket seats on 
the console. 
THE COURT: You searched the jacket? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir I did. 
THE COURT: Removed the case from the 
jacket? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Set it on the floor in about 
the area where -- I'm sorry --
THE WITNESS: Officer Jensen. 
THE COURT: •- Officer Jensen said he found 
it? 
THE WITNESS: I recall setting it on the 
driver's side floorboards. 
THE COURT: You don't remember putting it 
on the passenger's. 
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THE WITNESS: No, sir. I recall I was 
kneeling on the driver's seat searching the jacket 
that I had found and setting it on the floorboards 
of the driver's side. 
THE COURT: So if somebody moved it over 
there, somebody else did that? 
THE WITNESS: I don't know, sir. Officer 
Jensen came out to assist. I took the jacket 
outside of the vehicle to finish searching. 
THE COURT: But you think you put it on the 
driver's side because that's where you were? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEWELL: 
Q. Officer Johnston, did you do any weighing 
of these items which were (inaudible) by Officer 
Jensen? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did anybody else do any weighing of these 
items? 
A. That evidence, I did not handle that 
evidence, as far as the controlled substance that 
we found. 
Q. Did you ever question Mr. Doyle? 
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A. I did not. 
Q. I think before you previously testified 
you never videotaped any of this. 
A. No, I didn't. 
MR. JEWELL: I have no further questions. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MADSEN: 
Q. How long have you been a narcotics 
officer? 
A. About a year and a half. 
Q. Do you have experience with both sales and 
possession of individuals that have been charged 
with both? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you have an opinion --
MR. JEWELL: Objection, your Honor. I 
don't think this witness has the proper background 
to define --
MR. MADSEN: Perhaps if he'd let me ask the 
foundational questions before he interrupts about 
objecting to foundation. 
THE COURT: I don't know what he's going to 
ask yet. 
Q. BY MR. MADSEN: Do you have a professional 
opinion based on your experience with regard to 
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possession and distribution as to whether three 
bags would indicate possession with intent to use 
or possession with intent to distribute? 
MR. JEWELL: Well, I don't think that's 
foundation, your Honor. I don't think he should be 
entitled to give a (inaudible) opinion on this 
issue. I don't think it's been established that he 
had an extensive narcotics background to determine 
what's intent and what's not intent as far as 
amount of possession. 
THE COURT: I don't think the answer could 
help me. I think I would weigh it so little I 
don't think it could help me. I don't think it 
matters. 
MR. MADSEN: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: I don't know that it's 
inadmissible, but I just wouldn't be interested in 
the answer, I don't think. 
MR. MADSEN: State calls Officer Shawn 
Adamson• 
THE COURT: Thanks. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that 
the testimony you're about to give in the case now 
pending before this Court will be the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
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God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
SHAWN ADAMSON, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MADSEN: 
Q. Would you please state your full name and 
occupation. 
A. Shawn Adamson. I'm a deputy with the Utah 
County Sheriff's Department. 
Q. Did you participate in a search on the 
11th of November at the Hundley trailer? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Were you present when Shane Doyle and 
Ms. Olsen arrived at that trailer? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. Did you participate in the search of 
Mr. Doyle's vehicle? 
A. I did. 
Q* Did you in fact interrogate Mr. Doyle 
after his arrest or after the search? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Had he been Mirandized? 
A. He was. 
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Q. Did he make election to make any 
statements to you? 
A. He indicated to me that he understood his 
rights and agreed to speak with me. 
Q. Did you asked him regarding the ownership 
of the items of paraphernalia and the bags of 
methamphetamine that had been removed from the car? 
A. I did. 
Q. What did he say to you? 
A. He said that they were his and that the 
lady that was in the car when they arrived had 
nothing to do with it. 
MR. MADSEN: I have no further questions, 
your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEWELL: 
Q. Officer Adamson, you testified you were 
present when Mr. Doyle arrived; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And how did he arrive? 
A. They arrived in a white compact car, a 
small car, and came to the front door of the 
trailer. 
Q. And Mr. Doyle was not the driver? 
A. That's correct. 
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Q. Now, over here on the board we have a 
diagram that's been done by Officer Johnston. I 
just want you to take a glance at this. Maybe you 
can get situated with this diagram. This is north. 
A. Yeah, I recognize it. 
Q. This is No. 121. Fine. Would it be fair 
to say that this van parked in front of the trailer 
is -- this car, excuse me, parked in front of the 
trailer, would that accurately represent the van 
that you arrived in? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And would it be fair to say that this car 
here with the little triangle in it parked in 
front of the other trailer would be the car that 
Mr. Doyle arrived in; would that be accurate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So those locations are fairly accurate? 
A. It appears to be accurate to me, yes. 
Q. And then this would be -- this area right 
here just south of the trailer before you reach the 
next trailer would be a parking pad; would that be 
accurate? 
A. I believe that's what it is. I can't 
recall whether or not it was occupied by a vehicle 
at that time. 
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Q. Now, at the time the warrant was executed, 
what was your duties as far as the actual search? 
Were you to go in and search? Were you questioned? 
What was your duty at the time the warrant was 
actually executed on the house? 
A* I was assigned as the initial approach 
officer -- or one of the initial approach officers. 
Two of us walked to the front door and knocked on 
the door. 
Q. That would be you and Officer Leavitt? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And at the time that you knocked on the 
front door, someone answered? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who was that? 
A. Mr. Hundley. 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Hundley the purpose of 
your visit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you hand him the search warrant? 
A. It was provided to him, yes. It wasn't 
done immediately or right at that point. 
Q. Oh, at what point was it handed to him? 
A. I didn't see it given to him. 
Q. Who would have been involved with that? 
sS w V 112 
35 
A. The case officer, which in this case would 
have been Devon Jensen, I believe, 
Q. Now, at the time that you stated the 
purpose of your visit to Mr. Hundley, did you 
request the services of other officers? 
A. There were other officers present and 
waiting for us to get through the front door. 
Q. And did you eventually (inaudible)? 
A. Yes, they came in of their own accord. 
Q. And you conducted a search at that time? 
A. We did. 
Q. Who was present when you began conducting 
that search? 
A. From memory I didn't list the officers in 
my report. 
Q. I'm sorry, I meant the people at the home, 
not the officers. 
A. Oh, the suspects? There was Mr. Hundley 
and Mrs. Hundley. 
Q. Was there anyone else in the home? 
A. A small child. 
Q. But as far as the adults it was only 
Mr. and Mrs. Hundley? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then the search was begun? 
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A, Yes. 
Q. Now, were Mr. and Mrs. Hundley eventually 
placed under arrest? 
A. They were. 
Q. And who was responsible for doing that? 
A. I believe again Devon Jensen. Well, 
possibly Andre Leavitt, as well. He made the 
initial contact with Mr. Hundley. I don't know who 
placed them under arrest. 
Q. Were they -- do you recall if they were 
placed under arrest prior to the arrival of 
Mr. Doyle in this white vehicle that you've 
described earlier? 
A. I believe that they were. 
Q. Were they actually transported and pulled 
out of the house before Mr. Doyle arrived? 
A. I think that they were. 
Q. What about the small child? 
A. The child, someone had come to take that 
child. 
Q. And that was before Mr. Doyle arrived in 
this car? 
A. I believe it was. 
Q. How much time elapsed between when you 
knocked on the door to state the purpose of your 
•0^0 114 
37 
visit and when Mr. Doyle arrived in this white 
vehicle? 
A. I couldn't say exactly, but somewhere 
around 40 minutes. Between 40 minutes and an hour. 
Q. Okay. Nov, you've testified you had an 
opportunity to question Mr. Doyle; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And where did this questioning take place? 
A. In the living room at the trailer. 
Q. Had you told Mr. Doyle he was under arrest 
at that point? 
A. He was under arrest at that point. 
Q. Had you told him that? 
A. He was in handcuffs, as I recall. 
Q. And who had placed him in handcuffs? 
A. I had. 
Q. And at what point did you place him in 
handcuffs? When he arrived at the door or 
(inaudible)? 
A* After we had found the items of 
paraphernalia that tested positive for 
methamphetamine in his pocket. 
Q. So between when he arrived at the door and 
when you put the handcuffs on him, did you say, 
••You need to stay here. We're going to search your 
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car." or what happened? 
A. He was placed under arrest and maintained 
in custody there at the living room of the trailer. 
Q. Until the search could be done to the car? 
A. No. He was awaiting transport. 
Q. I'm sorry, I want you to give me the 
chronological order of things. 
A. Right. He came in the door. 
Q. Okay, he comes in the door. 
A. I searched him. 
Q. You searched him. 
A. I found paraphernalia. 
Q. You found paraphernalia. 
A. It was tested. Found to be -- to test 
positive for methamphetamine. 
Q. And at that point you --
A. He was placed under arrest. 
Q. And then after that the car was searched? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you've testified that this interview 
took place in the living room; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
<J. And were there any other officers present 
when this interview took place? 
A. Oh, yes, there were several around. 
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Q. Were there any with you listening to the 
interview? 
A. No, not participating specifically with 
the interview, no. 
Q. Was there a recording either video or 
audio made of this interview? 
A. No. 
Q. You indicated that that's when you believe 
you read him his Miranda rights. 
A. I did advise him of his rights as per 
Miranda. 
Q. And you've testified that he indicated he 
understood those rights. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he agreed to talk with you? 
A. He did. 
Q. And when he agreed to talk to you you 
stated that he indicated that the items found 
within the coat in the car were his; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How was it that -- did you ask him 
specifically? Did you show him the items and say, 
wIs this yours?11 or how was it you asked him about 
the items? 
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A. No, I told him that we had found three 
bindles of methamphetamine and a butane torch and 
some other items of paraphernalia. Specifically 
there was a pipe that was found in a cigarette 
package that was on the dash. 
All of the other items of drugs and 
paraphernalia were found in the leather coat that 
was in the car. I described these things to him 
and asked him if they were his. 
Q. And after so doing what was his indication 
to you, if any? 
A. He said that they were his. That they 
were planning on going with the Hundleys to 
Salt Lake. They were going to go up to a club 
there, and that he was taking his meth up there for 
that purpose. 
MR. JEWELL: I have no further questions of 
this officer, your Honor. 
MR. MADSEN: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MADSEN: The State rests. 
THE COURT: Will we hear from anyone else? 
MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you going to present any 
evidence? 
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MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you want argument? 
MR. MADSEN: Just briefly, your Honor. I 
think that the possession of methamphetamine in a 
drug-free zone with intent to distribute would be a 
question of fact for the jury. 
As to quantity, as to intent to distribute 
or intent to use, I think the only evidence before 
the Court is the three bindles, separately packaged 
bindles that were located, and that this defendant 
acknowledged notice of. 
We have not introduced evidence to carry 
the Count II, possession of marijuana. However, 
Count III, possession of paraphernalia, they've 
testified (inaudible) that this defendant 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Do you want to be heard? 
MR. JEWELL: Yes, your Honor, just briefly. 
I do not believe that the State has shown there was 
an intent to distribute. I also believed the State 
failed to show that this occurred in a drug-free 
zone. I think at a minimum they have to show what 
there is that constitutes a drug-free zone. 
THE COURT: Any direct evidence on that? I 
don't know if I've heard it either. 
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MR. MADSEN: I don't remember. 
THE COURT: I don't think so. 
MR. MADSEN: I do know what the testimony 
is. I'd like to petition to reopen, if the Court 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: We'll allow that if it's at 
issue. 
MR. JEWELL: If the Court's inclined to do 
that I would just as soon know specifically what 
they're trying to allege the drug-free zone is. 
MR. MADSEN: I'd like to recall Officer 
Denton Johnston. 
THE COURT: Do you believe there was prior 
testimony? 
MR. MADSEN: I didn't — 
THE COURT: I don't remember it. I was 
just about to ask you if you'd presented anything 
on that, if Counsel didn't bring it up, because if 
you did I didn't remember. 
MR. MADSEN: Well, he's the one that told 
me, your Honor. It involved the description of the 
park. 
(Officer Johnston retakes the witness stand) 
/// 
/// 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY BY MR. MADSEN: 
Q. Inside the Lamplighter, Officer Johnston, 
reminding you that you're under oath, are there 
areas set aside designated as parks and play areas? 
A. Yes, there is. 
Q. Is there one in the vicinity of this 
trailer? 
A. The street that runs east and west, just 
north of trailer No. 121, if you was to go one 
street over, there was a -- near trailer No. 25 
there's a -- not necessarily a clubhouse, but a 
maintenance-type shack or a shed there. By that 
there is a fenced area in which gym apparatus, 
playground apparatus and such has been set up 
within the park itself. 
Q. Is that within a thousand feet of this 
trailer? 
A. Oh, definitely within a thousand feet. I 
would say it's within 150 feet of that trailer. 
MR. MADSEN: I have no other questions, 
your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEWELL: 
Q. Officer, so is this area that you've 
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described, is it included within the trailer park 
itself? 
A. Yes, it sits in the middle. The trailer 
park encircles that area. 
Q. Okay, and what exactly -- you've described 
just gym apparatus. Just briefly tell us what 
there is there, if you recall. 
A. I believe there's a swing set, a small 
slide, the older type jungle gyms you would find on 
elementary school playgrounds. Just the maze and 
bars that's there. It has a four foot or so 
chain link fence around it. 
Q. And this is the area you believe is set 
aside for the owners of the trailer park to use? 
A. Yeah, the tenants of the trailer park for 
their kids to play on or whatever. 
MR. JEWELL: I have no further questions of 
the officer. 
THE COURT: Anything? 
MR. MADSEN: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Anybody want 
argument? 
MR. MADSEN: I believe, your Honor, that as 
far as that particular element is concerned, that's 
met by the designation of that area as a children's 
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playground in the presence of an enclosed area 
designated as that would provide adequate 
(inaudible) designated as a park and play area, 
THE COURT: Do you want argument? 
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, I think that's a 
stretch. I don't know if this is the point in 
which to address it, but it's not open to the 
public. I don't think it qualifies as a drug-free 
zone. 
THE COURT: I don't know either. I find 
that the evidence has to do with the children's 
playground is private in nature, not public in 
nature. For the use of the residents of the park. 
Isn't that what the showing would be? 
I'm going to find that that's probable 
cause. I think that's a specific finding on it. I 
frankly don't know if that's within the meaning of 
the statute or not. It enhances it. I think it's 
enough for probable cause. I bind over. The 
State's carried the burden of proof and I bind 
over. 
MR. JEWELL: On Counts I and III 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yes. I don't know that they 
dismissed it, but they acknowledged that they 
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didn't make a showing on Counts I and III. Not the 
marijuana. Whichever the marijuana is, it is not 
bound over. 
COURT CLERK: January the 5th at 8 o'clock, 
Judge Park. 
THE COURT: For that day and hour. Thank 
you. We're in recess. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on January 31, 1995) 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Shane 
Doyle. Are you ready, Mr. Jewell? 
MR. JEWELL: We are, your Honor. As a 
preliminary matter we'd like to have the Court make 
two corrections on the memorandum which was filed 
in this matter. On page 6 of that memorandum, that 
first paragraph in the middle of the page --
THE COURT: Is the memoradum numbered? 
MR. JEWELL: No, it's not, unfortunately. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JEWELL: The paragraph that kind of 
starts in the middle of the page there. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. JEWELL: Okay. I cite to the Utah 
Constitution. It should read Article 1, Section 
14. It's typed as Article l, Section 12. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JEWELL: And then on the next page, 
page 7, in the bold lettering up at the top once 
again, where it says, "Article 1, Section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution," it should read Article 1, 
Section 14. 
THE COURT: Got it. Mr. Madsen, are you 
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ready? 
H 
1 
[\ forward 
i Honor. 
1 that th 
MR. MADSEN: We are, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. Are you going 
or do you want --
MR. MADSEN: (Inaudible) partly, your 
I'm here to respond. The presumption is 
e magistrate did not error. That the 
magistrate issued a valid search warrant. The 
search 
i burden 
forward 
warrant was validly executed. It's there 
to prove otherwise, so I'll let them go 
. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, I believe that 
we've raised all the issues in our memorandum. The 
State h asn't responded in writing, so I think that 
the State needs to respond to the memorandum which 
we have submitted to the Court. Then based on 
their response we'll reply to that. 
to hold 
in the i 
writing 
THE COURT: Well, okay. Do you just want 
yours for reply? 
MR. JEWELL: Well, I've raised four points 
memorandum. The State hasn't responded in 
I think they need to respond to that 
before we can even make a reply. 
THE COURT: All right. If you don't want 
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to put forth your case, even though I have a 
memorandum. Sometimes Counsel likes to highlight 
parts of that memorandum, but if you want to hold 
it until reply then we'll have Mr, Madsen. 
MR. JEWELL: I'd need to know the States 
response in each of the points in the memorandum. 
I think we've laid out sufficiently the grounds for 
the motion. I think we've laid out why we believe 
the motion's overbroad, that it's unconstitutional 
that --
THE COURT: You said the motion's 
overbroad. You mean the search warrant? 
MR. JEWELL: The warrant's overbroad, 
correct. I think those are all laid out in the 
memoradum. I think they're laid out with extreme 
clarity. The State hasn't responded to any of 
that. 
THE COURT: The cases that you've cited, 
let me ask you some questions, then. The cases 
that you've cited does not go particularly to the 
search warrant itself and how broad that search 
warrant may be. Now, do you have any particular 
cases that limits the breadth of the search 
warrant? 
MR. JEWELL: I understand what you're 
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saying, because what has happened is the Courts 
have outlined what the standard isf but they have 
not necessarily applied that standard to a search 
warrant case. 
THE COURT: Well, let me narrow it down a 
little for you. As I read your memorandum it 
appears to me that you're attacking the search 
warrant itself, saying it's vague, too broad. It 
appears to me that you maybe ought to be attacking 
the conduct of the police officers as going beyond 
the search warrant itself. 
MR. JEWELL: Well, I think as I stated in 
my memorandum, since the warrant is overbroad 
and therefore unconstitutional, the search is 
impermissible and violates both the Fourth 
Amendment and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. I think that's --
THE COURT: Now, where is the search 
warrant unconstitutional, with some particularity? 
MR. JEWELL: Well, for example, looking at 
the search warrant itself as it's attached as part 
of the addendum to the motion, it states, "Your --" 
y-o-u-r, "are also hereby (inaudible) to search of 
any out-buildings, curtilage, vehicles and the 
person of any individual present at the time of the 
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execution of this warrant.11 
It fails to identify where these out-
buildings are located. It fails to identify where 
these vehicles are located. It fails to identify 
where these people are going to be located that 
should be searched. 
If the warrant wanted the people, out-
buildings and vehicles to be searched, those items 
present at the residence, it should have so stated. 
The way it's stated in the search warrant, it would 
allow someone to search the buildings of the next-
door neighbor, someone out on the street. It 
doesn't conform to the form of particularity 
required. 
THE COURT: You're going too fast for me. 
Where did you read from? 
MR. JEWELL: Okay. Are you looking at the 
last page of the search warrant? 
THE COURT: I am. 
MR. JEWELL: Okay. The paragraph where it 
states, "Now, therefore, you and each of you." 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. JEWELL: If you'll look at the last 
sentence of that paragraph. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay, now go ahead and 
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tell me again what your problems are with that. 
MR. JEWELL: As that sentence is written, 
it is unclear as to where these people, out-
buildings or vehicles are located that are 
permitted to be searched by the warrant. 
If it meant the people, out vehicles and 
out-buildings at the residence, it should have so 
stated. But as it is stated in the warrant, it is 
unclear. If we are to follow through on the 
authority granted by this type of sentence, it 
would allow the police to search anyone on the 
sidewalk, the buildings of the neighbors next door, 
people who were in no way associated with that 
residence. 
Furthermore, there needs to be some 
particularity as to why these other people should 
be searched. As it is stated in the memorandum and 
case law, the Fourth Amendment protects people. 
How can a magistrate grant authority to search all 
people? There's got to be some particularity. 
There's got to be some probable cause, some reason 
to have those people searched. 
Now, on the affidavit, the affidavit cites 
that the police believe that Steven Hunley is 
selling drugs. When they go to search the garbage 
133 
8 
can, they find four respondents to both Steven 
Hunley and Angela Hunley. There is no mention in 
the affidavit whatsoever of Mr. Shane Doyle. There 
is no mention in the search warrant of Mr. Shane 
Doyle. 
How can a magistrate grant broad authority 
to search any person that might be present at a 
place? There has to be particularity or a reason 
to search that particular person. It's not enough 
that someone there might be involved in the sale or 
usage of drugs. There has to be particularity as 
to that person. 
It's overbroad to allow anybody to be 
searched. That means if the grandparents were 
visiting for the weekend, they could be searched. 
That means the milkman who knocks on the door in 
the morning can be searched. Anyone can be 
searched. That's too broad. 
THE COURT: So that's what you're saying 
this warrant says to you? 
MR. JEWELL: I'm saying that the warrant 
as written is overly broad. There's failure to 
establish particularity to search all persons 
present. 
Moreover, the warrant doesn't identify 
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where these people, vehicles or buildings are. 
It doesn't say that these people, vehicles and 
buildings are within the curtilage or at the 
residence or anything else. 
It's so broad that an officer could 
reasonably take the information provided in the 
warrant and go search areas that have nothing to do 
with that household or residence. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 
MR. JEWELL: Yes, your Honor. Furthermore, 
besides the fact that the warrant is overbroad and 
fails to establish with particularity the probable 
cause for why Mr. Doyle should be searched, when 
Mr. Doyle arrived at the residence, according to 
the officers who testified at preliminary hearing, 
he arrived anywhere from 40 minutes to an hour and 
15 minutes after they'd begun their search. 
The camera, the video camera they'd been 
using to film what was going on had been placed 
away. Essentially they had come to the end of 
their purpose for searching. The officers are not 
permitted to sit around the house and wait for 
three days to see who might show up. That's 
impermissible. 
If they've fulfilled the purpose of their 
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search, there's no reason for them to stay there 
any longer. Therefore, the timing of the arrival 
of Mr. Doyle was after the timing as described in 
the warrant. According to the warrant it says --
last line of that paragraph, the last page of the 
warrant says, "At the time of the execution of this 
warrant. fl 
Well, when the officers went in to execute 
it, Mr. Doyle wasn't present. The people who were 
present were the two Hunleys and a child. By the 
time Mr. Doyle had arrived, as I stated earlier, 
anywere between 40 minutes to an hour and 15 
minutes after the officers had arrived at the 
house, the Hunleys had apparently been taken away. 
So had the child. The video camera had been put 
away. They were essentially done with the search. 
If the officers were allowed to remain 
there as long as they want, they could stay there 
several days and wait and see who shows up. That's 
not what this warrant is designed to do. The 
warrant is designed for a particular purpose. 
The purpose is to go and search the 
residence of these people, because they're the 
people against whom probable cause has been 
established, at least for the purposes of the 
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magistrate who signed the warrant. To allow them 
to go beyond that is unconstitutional. It's 
inappropriate and violates the Fourth Amendment and 
Article 1# Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
The car in which Mr. Doyle arrived, 
according to the officers, was parked in front of 
not the Hunleys trailer, the trailer that's being 
searched, but rather in front of the neighbor's 
trailer. 
Even if the warrant is corrected by 
looking at what the affidavit states, the officers 
cannot reach that car because it's not within the 
curtilage of the home. It's out on the public 
street where other cars are parked. They do not 
have authority to go and search any car on the 
street. You need probable cause to search that 
car. 
It's not enough that it states that a car 
present at the residence. If a car is not at the 
residence when they arrive, and even when they come 
out later to search the car it's still not at the 
residence, that's not appropriate. That would 
allow them to search any car on the public street 
within a few blocks of the residence. 
The warrant is overbroad, vague and 
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violates both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, as the timing 
of the search of Mr. Doyle and the car violates the 
wording in the warrant as described, which states, 
"At the time of the execution of this warrant," and 
as the car was outside of the scope of the 
authority of the warrant. 
Even if you don't find the wording in the 
warrant is vague and unconstitutional, it's still 
outside the scope of the warrant because it's not 
parked at that property. It's parked away from the 
property on the street in front of the neighbor's 
house. 
We believe that anything that resulted 
from that search, such as statements from Mr. Doyle 
and any evidence derived there from the illegal and 
unconstitutional search should be suppressed as 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Mr. Madsen. 
MR. MADSEN: Your Honor, I think the Court 
has began to sum up the State's position. The 
reason we haven't filed a response is I didn't 
really quite know what to respond to. 
The fact that a search warrant may not be 
overbroad is true. But in this case the search 
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warrant is very specific. The case law developed 
that you couldn't search individuals unless they 
were provided for in the search warrant. So 
they've gone to great pains to make sure that 
individuals present are included in the search 
warrant. 
The Court would have to find that a 
magistrate either is inherently without power to 
order the search of the individuals present at 
the cite of the search warrant, or that it is 
unconstitutional and overbroad to do so. It simply 
is not accurate. It is not overbroad and it is not 
unconstitutional for a magistrate to direct the 
search of individuals if there is some nexus. 
In this case, the cases cited, a primary 
case deals with a bar, where a search warrant was 
obtained for a bar and the bartender, and they 
searched all the patrons. They said that that was 
overbroad. This isn't a bar. This isn't a public 
place. This is a private residence, and the 
allegation was that they're dealing drugs out of 
the private residence. Now, that was what was 
presented to the magistrate. 
The Court would have to find that the 
magistrate is without power to issue a search 
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warrant that provides for the search of individuals 
at that scene, unnamed individuals. I think it's 
fatuous to argue that we didn't say where those 
individuals were. We don't know who those 
individuals are. We named the individuals that 
owned the property. We have no way of knowing in 
advance who will be present. 
Also, the argument that curtilage and 
out-buildings are not described begs the fact that 
curtilage and out-building is a description. It is 
a term of art. It has a legal meaning. It is 
legally defined. Curtilage is a specific location, 
a specific place. It is its own definition. Out-
building is its own definition. Persons present 
and vehicles present carries its own definition. 
It is at the location of the search. 
The search is very specifically described. 
It's described by color. It's described by 
location. It's described by street address. It's 
described by number. It's very particular about 
what sites is being searched. That goes to the 
overbroad. 
The constitutional is the same argument. 
To reach an argument that it is unconstitutional 
for a magistrate to issue a search warrant that 
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provides for the search of persons present at a 
suspected site for the distribution of controlled 
substanc 
1 
e is simply inaccurate. 
If they had provided information adequate 
for their warrant the magistrate does have the 
power to 
named or 
activity 
the loca 
art. It 
It names 
provide for the search of the persons 
unnamed who are present where the illegal 
is alleged to be occurring. 
It is not vague in the least. It names 
tion. It names curtilage, a legal term of 
names out-buildings, a legal term of art. 
vehicles, which is clearly not overbroad. 
Everybody knows what a vehicle is. It names 
persons, which are real individuals that are 
present where that search is being conducted. If 
they are 
search, 1 
or durin< 
warrant . 
officers 
present where they have the legal right to 
they have the legal right to search them. 
As far as not being present at the scene 
j the execution of the warrant, that 
is being executed from the time the 
take possession of the property until the 
time that they relinquish possession of the 
property That property is still in their control. 
To say that they should have been faster 
and should have been out completely begs the fact 
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that they were not. They were still in the 
execution of the warrant. The property was still 
under their control. 
To argue that the vehicle does not have a 
nexus to this search completely ignores the fact 
that this defendant arrived, went to the door, 
knocked on the door and entered the trailer where 
the search was being conducted. Only then to 
discover that the people who were inside were 
policemen. Not the people that he was there to 
see, who are the named suspected drug dealers. 
That they removed from this individual at 
that time drug paraphernalia. Then the defendant 
was placed under arrest. The nexus to the vehicle 
is that that's the vehicle that brought him to the 
scene. It is present at the scene. It's waiting 
for him. It's waiting for him to leave, and the 
officers searched it at the scene. 
THE COURT: Did he search with or without 
permission? As I understand he was a passenger, 
not the driver. 
MR. MADSEN: Well, they did not ask for 
permission to search the vehicle. Vehicles present 
during the search are named in the warrant. The 
search is still ongoing. The officers are still 
141 
17 
J present. They are still conducting the search. 
M The premises is still under their control. 
I Now, to draw to the (inaudible) that they 
J are not entitled to sit there three days, that's 
> entirely the question that they were not and did 
J not. They didn't search the milkman. They didn't 
search the grandparents. They didn't search the 
pizza boy. They searched the individual who came 
and knocked on the door at the house where the 
allegations are that the people are selling drugs 
to people that are doing exactly that. They're 
coming and knocking on the door and buying drugs. 
That's what this defendant did. He came 
inside the place, was searched, and paraphernalia 
was found. Illegal paraphernalia. When the 
vehicle was searched, three -- I believe it was 
ounces or at least three baggies of methamphetamine 
were removed from the vehicle. The vehicle is 
there present at the site of the search because it 
delivered this defendant there. 
The testimony at the preliminary hearing 
was it was parked at the first available parking 
space. That there was already a vehicle in place 
directly in front, and it parked directly behind. 
It's as present as it can get, without parking on 
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top of another vehicle. It can't get any more 
present at the location where they were. 
It wasn't overbroad. It specifically 
named what can be searched. It wasn't vague. It 
specifically identifies it to say that it is too 
vague if it doesn't say who the people are and 
where they are. 
Defense counsel even wants a search 
warrant that says, ,fWe will seek to search the 
following people, and this is where they are." 
Which means that from the -- the search warrant 
could be executed any time for ten full days. From 
the time it's prepared to magistrate approves it, 
it can be executed up to ten days later. 
To say that vagueness requires that we 
identify where people will be and which people will 
be there during that ten day period at the exact 
minute that the officers enter completely belies 
the legislative intent, it belies the language of 
the statute, and it belies the realities of the 
warrants. 
It isn't a warrant that's executable at 
one minute of one hour of one day, and you 
therefore must name everybody and where they'll be 
standing at the time that it's executed. There's 
143 
19 
no 
! to 
t 
was 
J is 
way to know in that ten-day 
be there when you get there. 
The nexus is provided 
presented to the magistrate 
period who's going 
by the affidavit, 
,, which says, "This 
the activities that we believe is going on at 
J this home. This is how they're 
business. We want a warrant to 
peo pie who might 
listed as owning 
and 
It' 
def 
he' 
vehicles and 
be there, and 
the place, and 
conducting 
allow us to search 
the people who are 
any out-buildings 
anything within the curtilage." 
That isn't overbroad. 
s not unconstitutional, and 
endant arrived an hour into 
d arrived ten 
permissible? If 
search. I mean, 
day 
to 
the 
you 
The 
s that they sa 
sit there. If 
door or just 
draw the line 
It's dur 
It isn't vague. 
the fact that this 
the search -- if 
minutes into the search is that 
he'd arrived one minute into the 
(inaudible) to 
y the officers 
he'd arrived 
after they hit 
? 
discuss the three 
weren't permitted 
as the officers hit 
the door, where do 
ing the execution of the warrant. 
magistrate made that clear. 
execution of this 
individuals that 
the execution of 
During the 
warrant you may search 
are present. 
the warrant. 
He was there during 
The officers still 
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had custody of the premises. He knocked. They 
opened the door. They're the ones that let him 
into the house. They still had custody and 
possession of it and the search is ongoing. 
I think all of those arguments fall by the 
facts. Not by what might have, could have, is 
argumentably possible in (inaudible), but what 
really did happen. What really happened is they 
got a warrant. They did what they were supposed to 
do. They provided information to the magistrate. 
They told the magistrate why they needed to search 
this place, search the buildings and search the 
individuals that might be there. 
The magistrate agreed with them and gave 
them a warrant that named the building, the out-
buildings, the vehicles and persons that might be 
there. Not by name, but by car and location during 
the execution of the warrant at this site. They 
executed it exactly pursuant to the directions from 
the magistrate. At that site, persons who were 
present during the execution of the warrant. 
I believe that all of the arguments fail. 
The cases cited did not apply to name -- there are 
certain cases where individuals are searched where 
no individuals are named in the warrant. They have 
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a warrant for a location but not people. They 
search them. 
They says, wNo, it protects people." So 
the officers have been instructed, "You can't 
search people unless you provide information to the 
magistrate and get a warrant for people.11 They 
did. 
Now it's overbroad because we couldn't 
tell the magistrate where in the building the 
people would be standing at the time that we did, 
where they would be. There's no way we can do 
that. There's no way it can ever be done. It's 
physically impossible. 
But they did exactly what they were 
supposed to do. They got exactly the kind of 
warrant they were supposed to get. They executed 
exactly the way they were supposed to do it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jewell. 
MR. JEWELL: Thank you, your Honor. I 
think Mr. Madsen misunderstands our argument. Our 
argument is not that they have to particularize 
where in the building such people will be found. 
Our argument is that the wording in the 
warrant is overbroad because it states, I quote 
again, "Your are also hereby directed to search of 
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any out-buildings, curtilage, vehicles and the 
person of any individuals present at the time the 
execution of this warrant." 
It does not state where those people, 
where those vehicles, where those (inaudible) are. 
If the warrant had sought to search those people, 
out-buildings, vehicles present at the residence, 
it should have so stated. It did so in the 
affidavit but it doesn't do it in the warrant. 
The way the wording is in the warrant, 
that warrant would literally allow an officer to 
search someone who is standing on any yard next 
door. It doesn't say where this person is. It 
says, "the persons present at the time of the 
execution of the warrant." It doesn't say where 
they're presen. 
That's what's overbroad. That's what's 
unconstitutionally vague about this. That's why it 
violates both the Fourth Amendment, Article 1, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
There needs to be an establishment of 
probable cause as to search the people there. Just 
stating, "We want to search everyone there," mere 
presence is not enough. They need to establish 
probable cause to do that. 
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As the warrant is worded, it is overbroad. 
It would literally allow an officer to search 
around the neighborhood. It does not --
MR. MADSEN: But it — 
MR. JEWELL: No. I'm sorry, this is my 
response. 
MR. MADSEN: You're sorry? I don't take my 
direction from you. If I stand up to object, I 
expect to address the Court. 
MR. JEWELL: Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't know 
you were going to object. I thought you were going 
to say something. 
MR. MADSEN: I've got to object at this 
point, your Honor. He keeps reading the last 
sentence. I think we've got to read the full 
paragraph. 
THE COURT: I've read the full paragraph. 
MR. MADSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, we have not stated 
that we think the description of the residence is 
vague. Our focus is on that last paragraph where 
it gives this broad authority to search people, 
vehicles and out-buildings without saying where 
those items are going to be found. 
As it is right now, it's unclear where 
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these people -- it would allow -- even though 
the officers did not search someone on the 
sidewalk, the problem isn't with the officers. 
The problem is the warrant's overbroad. It's 
unconstitutionally vague and it is overbroad. 
Another problem is the vehicle. That 
warrant -- even if it's written to say that they 
can search the vehicles at the residence -- and 
it's not written to say they can search vehicles at 
the residence. 
We need some clarity. According to the 
diagram drawn at the preliminary hearing, this is 
the trailer that's being searched. This is the pad 
to this trailer. This is the next-door neighbor's 
trailer. This in front -- so the next door 
neighbor's trailer is just south and lies just 
after the pad to the trailer being searched. 
In front of the neighbor's trailer is 
parked the vehicle. We'll call it the "suspect 
vehicle." How can the officers reach from this 
house to this suspect vehicle? There's no way. It 
doesn't fall within the warrant. 
Even assuming that the warrant had been 
written properly and said that the vehicles, the 
out-buildings, the persons or people present at the 
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residence, it's outside of the residential area. 
It's in front of the neighbor's vehicle. 
It doesn't matter that this might have 
been the parking spot available. Does that mean 
on the other side of the street a vehicle parked 
would qualify? Because according to the State's 
argument, that's what it would. Well, gee, it's 
the other residence (inaudible). That's the 
problem. It's overbroad. 
Even assuming that the -- excuse me. I 
misstated myself. Even assuming that the warrant 
was written correctly and stated with specificity 
that it was referring to the people, out-buildings, 
the vehicles present at the residence, if the 
warrant stated that, even assuming that, this does 
not fall within that. This is outside of the 
residential area. 
According to what the State has argued, 
any car in the street would qualify. It doesn't 
matter if Mr. Doyle stepped out of that car. That 
doesn't matter. They still have to have probable 
cause to search the car. It's not enough he 
stepped out of that car. He's not even the driver 
of the car, for heaven's sakes. 
How can they jump from here to here? 
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Well, they're trying to say they do it through the 
warrant,. But the warrant doesn't give them that 
authority. The warrant was written improperly. 
You need to assume if it was written properly it 
would only include the cars within the residential 
area. This one doesn't qualify. Otherwise, the 
officers are entitled to search any car within who 
knows what distance of the residence. This car 
does not fall within this area. 
Now, if the warrant had been written the 
way the affidavit had been submitted, there would 
be more clarity as to which cars, people and out-
buildings could be searched. The affidavit was 
more properly worded than the warrant. But even 
assuming it did use that exact same language, this 
car does not fall within the scope of the language 
even submitted in the affidavit. It is not at the 
residence. 
It doesn't matter if four people came out 
of the car and went to the residence and they were 
searched. This car doesn't fall within the scope 
of even what they asked for in the affidavit. If 
it did, if any car is subject to that, then that is 
completely unconstitutional, because it opens up a 
pandora's box to allow the police to just go search 
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anything because they think there might be a nexus. 
That's not enough. If they didn't get 
consent to search the car and there wasn't other 
reasons to get at the car -• and in this case 
apparently there wasn't because the driver of the 
car was someone else -- there's no way they could 
reach the search in that car. Therefore, anything 
they found in the car falls outside the scope of 
the warrant as it is, and even if the warrant were 
written correctly. The warrant as written is 
overbroad. It's unconstitutionally vague. 
At the time of the warrant we reitterate 
our argument that the defendant arrived substantial 
period of time after the execution of the warrant. 
Agreed, he didn't arrive one minute afterwards. He 
arrived anywhere from the officers 40 minutes to an 
hour and 15 minutes after the search had begun. 
If the State is allowed to just stay 
around forever, they could say, ••Well, we're not 
done searching the place, •• and they could sit on 
it. In this case apparently they did not. But 
we're not looking at what they did in this case. 
We're looking at what authority the warrant 
granted. 
Our argument is the authority granted by 
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the warrant is overbroad, unconstitutionally vague, 
and that the car in this matter falls outside the 
scope of the warrant, even if it was corrected 
through the affidavit. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. 
Suppose that the actual owners of the property had 
their cars parked across the street because there 
was no place to park in front of their mobile home. 
Would your argument be that they could not search 
those vehicles? 
MR. JEWELL: I think that if the car was 
parked outside the residence of the home and they 
didn't state that they wanted to get at the car, I 
don't know that they could get at the car because 
it's still parked outside that area. They're only 
granted so much authority by the warrant. 
I think in that case they'd have a better 
argument to have gotten at it through consent of 
the owners of the car or by some other means than 
issue under the search warrant, because frankly 
they'd already called the people off the property. 
They can ask for a search warrant to search the car 
itself. 
In this case we have a person who arrives 
in the car with someone else driving, and parked 
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1 away from the residence. The warrant does not 
2 grant them the authority to search that car. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Madsen, do you want 
4 to be heard? 
5 MR. MADSEN: Yes, very briefly, your Honor. 
6 If you take that paragraph in its totality, it is a 
7 description of what can be searched. 
81 THE COURT: I'm not going to — 
9 MR. MADSEN: When you get to curtilage, it 
10 has to be the curtilage of something. 
11 THE COURT: Sure. 
12 MR. MADSEN: If it's out-building it 
13 has to be of something. The other is phrased as 
14 "present." There is only one parking pad for this 
15 trailer. Everybody else who's present has to be on 
16 the street or on top of that car. 
17 Now the question is, "What does 'present' 
18 mean?" If the owner's car is there is it present 
19 at this residence? Of course it is. If the 
20 individual who comes up and knocks on that door to 
21 gain entry is there in a vehicle, is it present at 
22 that residence? Of course it is. 
23 All of that is very carefully spelled out 
24 in this warrant. It is not overbroad. It is not 
25 vague. To argue that it has to be physically up on 
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the property and named in advance is impossible. 
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Jewell? 
MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: In this case, the Court reading 
the paragraph in its totality is convinced that it 
is not broad, too broad or vague. That the general 
refers back to general modified by the specific. 
Even though the terms out-buildings, curtilage and 
vehicles are general in nature, it has to be 
modified by the description of the property that is 
there. 
This property is not only described by an 
address. It's described by color. It's described 
by the numerals 121 of the trim, with the main 
entrance facing south. I can't see that anyone 
would think that that should be vague or too broad 
under the circumstances, when you go back and read 
the paragraph in its entirety. 
Court finds that the magistrate has the 
constitutional right to issue a warrant which calls 
for the search of the curtilage, the vehicles and 
the persons of any individuals present at the time 
of the execution of the warrant. 
Execution of the warrant does not mean the 
moment that the warrant is handed to the owners of 
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the property. The execution of that warrant begins 
at that point in time when the officers enter the 
premises, and it terminates when the officers 
leave. 
Up to that point in time, if we have a 
situation such as this, where a person comes to 
that door and then enters into that property, then 
it would appear to me that they have all the right 
in the world to search that person. 
If that person had nothing on him, if he 
had no illegal drugs, no illegal paraphernalia, 
then the officers would not have any right to 
search a vehicle. 
But the nexus, as Mr. Madsen has 
indicated, is the fact that he had drugs -- or 
rather drug paraphernalia on him. Illegal drug 
paraphernalia. And this is the nexus that gives 
them the opportunity. It's this Court's ruling it 
gives them the right, not unconstitutional but the 
absolute right to search that vehicle to make a 
determination if there is any further drugs. Once 
he's placed under arrest they certainly have the 
right to do that. 
I don't know who owned the vehicle. I 
don't know who the driver was. I don't know if any 
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permission was ever asked of anybody, but the nexus 
there and the case law in this Court's opinion is 
pretty clear that authorizes them to do that. 
Have I addressed everything? 
MR. JEWELL: I believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Madsen, will you prepare an 
order consistent with this Court's ruling? 
MR. MADSEN: I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jewell to approve form. 
Send it to the Court. 
MR. MADSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. JEWELL: Thank you, your Honor. 
I'm sorry, your Honor. There was 
something else, before Mr. Madsen leaves. My 
client wanted me to address the Court regarding 
bail. Are we still on the record? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. JEWELL: Okay, thank you. Your Honor, 
Mr. Doyle has indicated that he would like the 
Court to consider lowering bail in this matter. 
He's not asking the Court to OR him, but lower the 
bail so that he might have the opportunity to go 
out and take care of some matters. 
He indicates that if he were released on a 
— if there were a lower bail imposed and he were 
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able to make that and be released, he would go live 
at an address of 293 North 850 West in Orem. 
That's a place where he has lived since July of 
'94. 
He also believes that he could return to 
work for Chadwick Masonry in Provo where he worked 
for approximately a year full-time. He's also 
indicated that he's worked construction in this 
valley for approximately 15 years. 
I think, according to --
THE COURT: Well, before you go any 
further, the bindover on this says he's on OR on 
this case. 
MR. JEWELL: On this one? 
MR. DOYLE: I've been at the county jail 
since November 11th on this case with a $4,000 
bondable bail. 
THE COURT: Well, just let me look through 
the file further. The bindover says, "Bail, ROR 
this case. Remanded to county jail on other 
charges.w 
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, Mr. Doyle 
indicates that he believes Judge Dimick in Orem 
said that you would entertain bail on another 
matter based on what happens on bail on this. 
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Frankly I don't have any independent 
recollection of anything. What I do have in the 
notes I have are $4,000 bond, $2,000 cash on the 
30th of November, I do not recall whether or not 
the status on that changed. 
So you're saying as far as this Court's 
concerned he is OR'd on this matter? 
THE COURT: Well, let me go back further 
here. You might have some merit in what you're 
saying. North circuit court -- oh, here we go. 
Bail is set at 2,000 cash, 4,000 bond. That was at 
a preliminary on December 15th. The bindover, for 
whatever reason --
MR. JEWELL: Is that — 
THE COURT: See if there's anything in the 
notes that addresses that. The note itself taken 
during the preliminary examination doesn't say 
anything that I can see. 
So I don't know why we have the conflict 
that bail 2,000 cash, 4,000 bond, and then the 
bindover in the case that he's ROR this case 
remanded to Utah County on other charges. 
MR. JEWELL: The end notes I have from the 
bindover is just that Counts I and III were bound 
over and Count II was dismissed (inaudible) for 
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this, but I don't have anything reflecting the 
issue of bail at that time. I don't know if the 
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situation, where he'd go, 
THE COURT: Give me a little bit about his 
criminal background, whether he has a family he's 
living with. 
MR. JEWELL: Right. He has family here in 
Utah valley. He's indicated in the past that as 
far as there was a possession of cocaine charge 
back in either '88 or '89, a Class A misdemeanor 
for something, three DUI's, a felony assault in 
Wyoming. He says he has had no charges since 1989. 
The only thing that he would have would be possibly 
a retail theft in Orem, and he's supposed to have a 
trial on that. 
THE COURT: And he's married? 
MR. DOYLE: I'm currently separated, your 
Honor. I have two children that are in my custody. 
THE COURT: In your custody? 
MR. DOYLE: Yes. 
THE COURT: And Where's your ex-wife? 
MR. DOYLE: She's living in Provo. She has 
the children right now but upon my release I will 
probably take them over. She voluntarily gave me 
custody of the children. 
THE COURT: Mr. Madsen, do you have any 
suggestions? 
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MR. MADSEN: Most of what I'm looking at 
is from the A's with the cocaine charge in late 
'89, but I also have an August charge of false 
information, with no official determination yet. 
I don't think that a few thousand dollar 
bail for anyone with local contacts, if we make 
that cash or bond assurety, it's not only 
reasonable bail, it's quite low for the charge. 
THE COURT: I'll reduce it to $2,000 cash, 
bond or assurety. 
MR. JEWELL: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHANE DOYLE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 941400879 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
This matter came before the Court for a Suppression Hearing, the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding, on January 31, 1995. The Defendant 
was present and represented by Michael E. Jewell, Utah County Public 
Defender Association, Attorneys for Defendant. The plaintiff was 
represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Craig Madsen. The Court 
having reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum and having heard 
argument from both Plaintiff and Defendant and being advised in the 
premises does hereby make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1) The general language of the warrant refers back to the 
specific language of the warrant--the terms out-building, curtilage 
and vehicles are modified by the description of the property. 
2) The property in the warrant is described by address, color, 
numerals and the direction which the main entrance faces. 
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3) Defendant had drug paraphernalia on his person. 
4) The Court did not find who owned the vehicle, who the driver 
was or whether permission was asked to search the vehicle. 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1) The authority-granting paragraph in the warrant in its 
totality is neither too broad or vague. 
2) The magistrate has the constitutional right to issue a warrant 
which calls for the search of the curtilage, the vehicles and the 
persons of any individuals present at the time of the execution of the 
warrant. 
3) Execution of the warrant does not mean the moment that the 
warrant is handed to the owner of the property, but rather the 
execution of that warrant begins at that point in time when the 
officers enter the premises, and it terminates when the officers 
leave. 
4) Up to the point in time when the officers leave, they have the 
right to search a person who comes to that door and then enters into 
that property. 
5) The fact that Defendant had drug paraphernalia on his person 
gives the police the right to search that vehicle to make a 
determination if there are any further drugs. 
6S 
ORDER 
The Court, having reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum and 
having heard argument from both Plaintiff and Defendant and being 
fully advised in the premises does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE: 
That Defendant's Motion to Suppress be Denied. 
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